A. The Federal Law on Counteracting Terrorism of 6 March 2006

 

1. The law targets ideologies as well as practices by including them in the definition of terrorism and terrorist activity.

The law defines terrorism not only as “practices of influencing the decisions of government, local self-government or international organizations by terrorizing the population or through other forms of illegal violent action,” but also any “ideology of violence” (art. 3).

The definition of terrorist activity, which complements the definition of terrorism, is even broader. The new law includes the following in the definition of such activity: propaganda of terrorist ideas; dissemination of materials or information which call to terrorist activity, justify or support the need for such activity, and also "informational or other types of aiding and abetting with regard to planning, preparation or implementation of a terrorist act" (art. 3).  

This definition can easily be interpreted to include any “alien” or “offensive” ideology or political agenda (e.g. communist), or dissent (e.g. opposition to the Russian government’s policies in the North Caucasus).

"Informational aiding and abetting” liability may potentially hinder communication concerning terror and specific terrorist acts. Broadcasting the demands of terrorists or disclosing the actual number of hostages as opposed to officially quoted numbers can easily be interpreted as terrorist activity making a conscientious reporter criminally liable.

 

2. The law provides for a special regime of counter-terrorist operations which will facilitate a serious restriction of most civil rights and liberties. 

The Russian Constitution (art. 56) provides for certain restrictions of rights and liberties in a state of emergency. The Federal constitutional Law on the State of Emergency establishes a procedure of introducing the state of emergency (a Presidential decree approved by the Federation Council, with notification of the State Duma), liability for citizens and officials in case of non-compliance, and immediate notification of the UN and the Council of Europe Secretary Generals about temporary restrictions imposed on rights and liberties, which constitute derogations from international instruments, the scale of such derogations and the reasons. The introduction of the state of emergency (or the state of war) is subject to numerous restraints and controls. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention permit derogations from civil rights and liberties only in time of public emergency which is officially proclaimed.

The counter-terrorist operation regime imposes the same restrictions, but without proclaiming the state of emergency. Moreover, the counter-terrorist operation regime is not limited in time or space, does not require accountability and is free from parliamentary or international controls.  

The former 1998 Law on Combating Terrorism also provided for substantial restrictions of civil rights and liberties and for special powers of officials in charge of counter-terrorist operations. While the 1998 law was often criticized, it contained an important clause allowing derogations only "in the area of the counter-terrorist operation,” whereas the 2006 Law on Counteracting Terrorism does not mention or define “the area of counter-terrorist operation.” 

The difference is crucial. The 1998 law defined  "counterterrorist operation zone” as “particular areas of land or water, vehicle, building, structure, installation, or premises and the adjoining territory or waters within which the aforementioned operation is carried out.” This qualification makes temporary restrictions legitimate (e.g. in the firefighting operation, etc.).

However, the 1998 legal definition was too narrow for what the Russian authorities have described for nearly eight years as a “counterterrorist operation” covering the entire Chechen Republic.     

While declaring a state of emergency would have been the only appropriate solution,  the Russian authorities preferred to delete the “zone of counter-terrorist operation”  from the law and provide for a possibility of counter-terrorist operations in a ”territory with a substantial number of residents" (article 12), without any special limits whatsoever. The area of counter-terrorist operation is determined at the discretion of the official in charge appointed by some unknown (not mentioned in the law) authority and accountable only to the FSB Chief.  This unknown official will decide whether the counterterrorist operation covers one apartment block or half of the Russian territory.

Whereas the constitutional state of emergency may be introduced for a maximum of 30 days in the entire country and for a maximum of 60 days in parts of the country, and any extension is subject to a complicated procedure, the law does not limit the “period of conducting” a counter-terrorist operation (article 11).

Restrictions of human rights and civil liberties during a counter-terrorist operation are virtually the same as in a state of emergency.

The counter-terrorist regime warrants:

ID checks;

blanket screening of negotiations, letters and other communications, and also "conducting searches of electric communication channels and the mail”;

suspension of companies and enterprises;

cutting individuals or entities from communications, communication networks and devices (i.e. total information blockade) - not allowed even in a state of emergency;

restrictions on movement of vehicles and pedestrians (i.e. slightly camouflaged curfew);

unhindered access by persons conducting a counter-terrorist operation to private homes and land plots, and to premises of all types of organizations for purposes of fighting terrorism;

checks and searches at the entrance to locations covered by the security regime;

restrictions or ban on the sale of certain goods, including alcohol.

A few items on this list deserve a special mention: the screening of negotiations and the “search of networks,” and also unhindered violations of privacy, i.e. access to private homes.

The screening of mail, phone conversations, telegraph and other communications may be allowed, according to part 2, art. 23 of the Constitution, only through judicial proceedings with regard to a specific individual or entity. Blanket violations of privacy with regard to an unlimited number of persons cannot be allowed even in a state of emergency.

As to privacy of the home, the new law effectively strips it of any judicial protection, given that a counter-terrorist operation regime can be instantly declared and terminated in any community, at the door of any home or apartment.

On a positive note, art. 11 of the new law requires immediate announcement of a decision to establish a counter-terrorist operation regime, indicating the area, measures and restrictions involved, and also a decision to terminate the regime. Although the format and procedure of such announcements are not specified, the requirement to announce a counter-terrorist operation can serve as partial protection from arbitrariness, because in absence of such announcement the actions of “counter-terrorists” will be illegal.

 

3. The Russian Army is allowed to fight terrorism in and outside Russia

The use of armed forces to fight terrorism domestically was allowed by the 4 April 2005 amendment of Article 10 of the Federal Law on Defense. The amendment provides for using the Army for purposes other than defense of the country against aggression, i.e. using the army as police.

The Law on Counteracting Terrorism allows using the armed forces against terrorists without any restrictions. In addition to individual units and detachments, the President can mobilize entire armies against terrorists (art. 9). In principle, the law does not rule out a counter-terrorist operation covering the entire country.

Military force may also be used "to suppress international terrorist activity outside the Russian Federation (art. 6). Art. 10 legalizes targeting “terrorists and/or their bases” in other countries from the Russian territory, as well as using the Russian armed forces outside Russia.

Subsequent amendments of 27 July 2006 of the Law on Counteracting Terrorism empower the Russian President to make personal decisions concerning the use of security forces outside Russia to combat terrorist activity against the Russian Federation. Whereas the President’s decision to use the regular army outside Russia requires the endorsement of the Federation Council, the FSB security forces may be used by the President at his discretion. Notably, security forces will probably fight terrorists without regard to any laws or rules.

  

4. Officials in charge of counter-terrorist operations are not identified

The law fails to explain how counteraction to terrorism must be organized. It only says that the FSB Chief decides to launch a counter-terrorist operation or delegates the decision to another official. Then someone is appointed in charge of the operation – the law mentions this individual with enormous powers in just a few words: "a counter-terrorist operation shall be led by the chief of the operation" (art. 13).

The law reflects the practice: the name of the official responsible for the Beslan counter-terrorist operation is still unknown to the public.  

 

5. Collective liability for family members

According to art. 18 of the Federal Law, “there shall be no compensation for any damage to the health or property of a person involved in a terrorist act, or for any damage caused by the death of such person, where such damage results from lawful suppression of a terrorist act.”

In the meaning of article 49 of the Russian Constitution, anyone killed in a security operation must be presumed innocent, while a survivor may be found guilty by court.

Where a suspected terrorist is killed, liability if effectively extended to his/her family, including young children - a phenomenon well-known from the Soviet history.