"Special Operations [zachistka]”
The slang word “zachistka” is used
both by the representatives of federal forces and by the local residents. It
designates an operation when a village or town is blocked and, without any
sanction from the public prosecutor or any witnesses, soldiers search houses
one after another and detain all suspicious people. Officially “zachistka” is
called a “special operation aimed to check people’s residence permits and
identify participants of illegal armed formations”.
No legislative instruments regulate
such special operations. Moreover, continuous searches in people’s homes
without any sanctions from public prosecutors, arbitrary detentions of people,
holding them in the places that are not stipulated by the law directly
contravene the RF legislation.
All this is aggravated by frequent
cases of violence against local residents - beatings and robberies that take
place during such “zachistkas”. Quite often “zachistkas” entailed murders of
innocent civilians, tortures and “disappearance” of the arrested persons. The
examples of such “zachistkas” are numerous.
The “zachistkas” in the
Thus, in Novy-Aldy and the adjacent
district of the city of
Applications by the relatives of the
innocent civilians from Staropromyslovsky district arbitrarily executed during
the “zachistka” in January 2000 were submitted to the ECHR (the case of
“Magomed Hashiyev and Roza Akayeva versus
On February 24, 2005, the Court
passed a decision on the case. The RF was found
guilty of the violation of art. 2 (right to life), art. 3 (torture ban) and
art. 13 (right to effective national protection) of the ECPHRFF.
In the summer of 2000, large-scale
battle actions were replaced with guerilla warfare; “zachistkas” started being
used more often and, like before, were accompanied with cruelty, violence and
robberies.[2]
Mass non-selective detentions of
local residents became an important distinctive feature of many “zachistkas”
throughout 2000-2003. The detained persons were taken to the “temporary
filtration points” (“FPs”, for more details see chapter … ), where they were
subjected to beatings and tortures. Such was the way used by the federal forces
trying to obtain information on the people from the village supporting
insurgents and hiding weapons. At the same time, they formed a network of
secret informants.
The robberies accompanying these
“special actions” became of organized nature – property was sometimes openly
taken out of the houses by military trucks.
Local residents repeatedly submitted
complaints to the organs of the Prosecutor’s Office, commandants, offices of
the Ministry of Interior, the RF President, etc. Heads of administrations of
numerous Chechen villages and towns also filed complaints regarding the actions
by the employees of security agencies during “zachistka”.
One cannot say that federal
authorities did not respond to this kind of complaints.
On May 24, 2001, Commander of the
Coalition Task Force in the
In June-July,
These actions were broadly covered
both in
However, the “zachistkas” that
followed after the issuance of order No
At last, in 2002, the employees of
the Prosecutor’s Office really started attending the “zachistkas”. However, the
presence of one or several prosecutors during these special operations with
dozens and hundreds of security officers involved could not mend the situation
dramatically. Those of the public prosecutors who tried to stop the crimes
often encountered resistance of the military.
The employees of the military and
law enforcement bodies never introduced themselves when entering the houses during
the special operations, their faces being masked. The armored personnel
carriers that brought these employees either had no license plates or their
plates were purposely mudded or painted. Therefore, it was difficult to
identify after the “zachistka” who was responsible for the operation.
The legal rights organizations tried
to insist that the federal army commanders in
Finally, on March 27, 2002, before
the discussion of the issue related to Chechnya in the UN Commission for Human
Rights, the Coalition Task Force general Moltenskoy issued order No 80 through
which he obliged his subordinates to follow the aforementioned elementary norms
of the law. However, this order was practically never executed.
Here are just two examples:
“Zachistka” in the
Eighteen persons from those arrested
simply “disappeared”. Fragments of the other three blown up bodies were found
by the locals near the FP. The Prosecutor’s Office admits that the “disappeared
ones” were detained by the security officers:[3] “During the special operation of 21.06, 2002, unrecognized persons took
away to the FP Ortsuyev Islam Abdulayevich, born in 1980. The latter was taken
away from his home at 157 Lenin str., village of Mesker-Yurt in pretence of the need to check the
documents and tracklessly disappeared.” Such are the statements used in relation to 21
persons. Criminal cases on the facts of their “disappearance” had been
initiated but the investigation was later on suspended due to the “impossibility to
identify the persons to be charged of the crime”.
On August 16, 2002, Russian armored
troop carrier was mined and several soldiers wounded at the outskirts of the
At the beginning of November 2002,
the RF President declared that no broad-scale special operations should be any
more held in the ChR towns and villages. After that, the number of large-scale
“zachistkas” in Chechen towns and villages started gradually going down and
decreased sharply after the summer of 2003. Nevertheless, large-scale special
operations continued being held, although much rarer than before.
For example, 27 special operations were held in
Sometimes, special operations were held only by the ChR Ministry of
Interior units, sometimes – jointly with the federal military forces; there
were cases when “zachistkas” were performed by the federal forces
independently.
Order No 80 was practically never executed in full.
Some of its provisions were observed only in some cases. However, when
holding searches of the houses and courtyards, senior officers of militia or
military groups practically never introduce or identify themselves. They
usually do not present the lists of arrested persons to the heads of local
governments.
Unlike the period of 2000, the most outrageous violations of order No 80
have been taking place not during “zachistkas” but in the course of targeted
local operations in the towns and villages starting with the first half of 2003
until nowadays.
During the ChR presidential election campaign in July 2004, an attempt
was made to reanimate order No 80. The ChR officials repeatedly insisted that
the order is equally effective for the troops of the RF Ěinistry of Defence,
the RF Ministry of Interior and for the employees of the ChR Ministry of
Interior.
On July 16, the ChR Deputy Minister of Interior, militia colonel Akhmed
Dakayev declared that “Provisions of
order No 80 by the Commander of the Coalition Task Force in the Northern
Caucasus are coming back into effect. Under this order, all the movements of
armored vehicles and military groups about the Republic should be made under
the control of commandants of towns and rural districts… The regulation of the
special operations procedure is due to the having become more frequent cases of
kidnappings in the Republic.”
Alu Alkhanov, major candidate for
presidency, declared that “the matter in
question is not the prohibition
against detention of criminals, but the need to do it legally, and, most
importantly, providing information as to
who has detained this or that person and where this person is at the given
moment”. However, later the ChR officials mainly concentrated on the
observance of the instruction that during special operations the employees of
the Ministry of Interior should not mask their faces.
In 2004 – 2006, not only the number of “zachistkas” went down but also
the scale of human rights violations during the special operations was usually
much lower than before.
Nevertheless, the level of cruelty
during some of the “later zachistkas” could be compared with those of the worst
times.
On January 14,
The events having taken place in the
The Prosecutor’s Office
initiated criminal case No 34/00/0013-05 on the facts of arsons, murders and
kidnappings, a special
joint investigatory group visited the scene of operation. However, the weapon
was seized from soldiers of the “Vostok” battalion to carry out a ballistic
examination only several months after the episode. One and a half year later
the investigation is not yet completed, the fate of the kidnapped villagers of
Borozdinskaya has not been established, nobody has been held criminally liable
for kidnappings, murders and tortures. One officer of the battalion, Mukhadi
Aziyev, was put on probation in October 2005 “for abuse of power” as he had
permitted his soldiers enter the village. What these soldiers were doing in the
village, who of them killed and set on fire the houses taking away the people
has not been established in the course of investigation.
Some time
after these events, the commander of the “Vostok” battalion Sulim Yamadayev was
awarded with the honorable Russian medal of “Hero of Russia”.
[1]
Three of them are presently living in the
[2]
See, for example the report by the
[3]
Response of the ChR Prosecutor’s Office to the inquiry made by the