Human Rights Center "Memorial"

Northern Caucasus

Conflict Spill-Over Outside the Chechen Republic in 2004-2005 (Ingushetia and Kabardino - Balkariya)

The Republic of Ingushetia

(A detailed analysis of the situation in Ingushetia is described in details in a report by HRC “Memorial” «A Conveyer of Violence. Human rights violations during anti-terrorist operations in the Republic of Ingushetia»)

In the very beginning of the second Chechen war Ingushetia hosted large numbers of forced migrants from the Chechen Republic. The Federal Center from the very beginning exerted pressure on them in order to make them return to Chechnya, while the security forces insisted on the expansion of the zone of "counterterrorism operations" to Ingushetia. However, Ingush authorities successfully resisted these attempts until the end of 2001, thereby supporting the stability of the republic.

The situation began to change in 2002. Abductees, most of them IDPs from Chechnya, disappeared in the course of the "special operations" which had begun in Ingushetia.¹ The bodies of some of the "disappeared" were later discovered on the territory of the Chechen Republic. In the majority of cases, the circumstances of abduction directly implicated representatives of the federal law-enforcement agencies in criminal acts. "Special operations" which at times became large-scale "cleanup" operations began in IDP camps around the middle of 2002. This practice was part of a campaign to stimulate the out-migration of IDPs back to Chechnya. In isolated cases these operations were provoked by the actions of fighters.

Federal troops were deployed in Ingushetia.² Frequently the special operations for catching alleged combatants were carried out taking no notice of security of the civilian population, which led to fatalities.

The year 2003 saw a significant escalation of violence in Ingushetia³. Those who have disappeared and been killed include not only "victims of abduction by unidentified people" but also people whose detention or arrest was an acknowledged fact.

In 2003, "cleanup" operations accompanied by large-scale violations of human rights began in Ingushetia, not only in the densely packed living areas of IDPs, but in Ingush villages as well. The media regularly reported the detentions or killings in Ingushetia of fighters and the discovery of weapons caches. There was also a manifest increase in the activity of fighters in Ingushetia in comparison with previous years. Police officers were attacked and military convoys ran over landmines.

In 2004 permanent residents of Ingushetia began to "disappear" more and more often as a result of special operations⁴. In many cases the criminal involvement of federal law-enforcement agencies was plainly adduced by the circumstances of abduction, witness testimony, and indirect evidence.

The definitive extension of the Chechen variant of "counterterrorism operations" to Ingushetia took place following an attack of insurgents on the night from 21 to 22 June, 2004. At this time a large detachment of fighters (from 200 to 600 men), whose ranks comprised many ethnic Ingush, infiltrated Ingushetia and temporarily took control of a series of settlements, including the cities Nazran and Karabulak. The only resistance to the fighters was shown by officers of the Interior Ministry of Ingushetia, as a result many of the latter were killed or wounded. The Ingush police force received help from neither the army nor the internal military forces during the course of events⁵. In the course of the operation, the fighters carried out extra-judicial executions of many agents of law-enforcement agencies whom they had captured. In all, at least 79 people were killed as a result of the attack, including 43 agents of law-enforcement agencies, and at least 88 people received wounds of varying seriousness.

For 48 hours after the attack, there were no operations of any kind carried out in Ingushetia, and the fighters quietly left. Only then did law-enforcement agencies begin "active searches" for participants in the attack. In many ways, the events of 21-22 June were a turning point. If before the attack law-enforcement agencies of Ingushetia were occasionally suspected in flagrant violations of human rights, after the attack such cases became the norm.

Cleanup operations were conducted first and foremost in the compact settlements of IDPs from Chechnya. Due to the coordinated efforts of Russian and international human rights organizations, it was possible to put an end to the wave of indiscriminate violence, and most of those detained were freed⁶.

In many ways, the events of 21-22 June were a turning point. If before the attack law-enforcement agencies of Ingushetia were occasionally suspected in flagrant violations of human rights, after the attack such cases became the norm.

After the hostage situation in Beslan, Ingushetia was definitively added to the list of suspect republics and became a regular and permanent zone for conducting "counterterrorism" operations. The torture of residents of Ingushetia in places of preliminary detention acquired a systematized character. Here, as in Chechnya, the conveyer belt of violence and fabrication of criminal cases was moving steadily.

After the Beslan tragedy, the leadership of law-enforcement agencies redoubled its efforts to demonstrate its effectiveness in fighting terrorism. Law-enforcement agencies and special services of the North Caucasus republics were faced with the task of eliminating or bringing to justice participants in terrorist activities. One is left with the impression that, in fulfilling this task, law-enforcement agencies have completely abandoned the boundaries of law, inasmuch as they commit gravest violations of the inalienable rights.

The main characteristics of "counterterrorism operations" in Ingushetia are as follows⁷.

Representatives of law-enforcement agencies often detain unlawfully people suspected of participating in illegal armed formations. The agents do not present any documentation or explain the motives for the detention and do not reveal the location to which the detainees are taken. Relatives of detainees do not know whether the FSB agents or bandits have taken their loved ones, and have no idea where they are located. Detainees usually "disappear" for some time (from several hours to several days).

A substantial fraction of unlawfully detained (or abducted) people are "discovered" later in provisional detention facilities; not infrequently in North Osetia. Many of the abducted disappear without a trace.

Law-enforcement agents attempt to obtain confessions from detainees usually by the application of savage beatings and torture. There is ample witness testimony to suggest that detainees have been subjected to this treatment on the premises of the UBOP, the Ingush Interior Ministry, in the Nazran police department, in the basement of the FSB building in Magas, in provisional detention facilities in North Osetia, and in locations of unlawful detention. A part of these cases have been documentarily confirmed.

The lawyer on duty at the investigations makes no record of the application of torture to suspect; neither does he require that the suspect receive medical treatment or undergo forensic medical examination to verify his condition. At this time relatives, more often than not, do not know the location of detainees and cannot get him a different lawyer. Even when a lawyer is hired by relatives, he is kept from seeing his client under various pretexts until the suspect has signed a confession.

The suspect is forced, under torture, to admit to the crimes of which he is accused (also to other as crimes registered as undisclosed with the local law-enforcement agencies), and is required to name people he knows to be involved in illegal activities or to incriminate other suspects of the investigation. "Even the most hardened people say it is impossible to bear this torture. Sooner or later, everyone breaks," said a lawyer working with this category of suspects. The human rights center Memorial has information on several cases when a suspect was delivered in serious condition to the hospital. There is evidence that, in addition to the beatings and torture, the detainee or arrestee is subjected to psychological pressure. For example, he may be threatened with sexual violence against himself or against his wife. Such threats are the most effective arguments in favor of "confession".

In the midst of the physical violence and psychological pressure, the man under investigation is told it is better for him to "cooperate" with the investigation and sign everything. Then the investigator can try to "help" him by remedying the situation after the matter has been turned over to the courts.

Confessions are usually signed in the FSB building or in the office of the criminal investigator and are then verified in the presence of lawyers. The detainee is not tortured at this time. He is warned, however, that should he refuse confession he will be "worked over" even more heavily. Should the detainee begin to refuse to give a statement as early as the preliminary investigation, the threats are made into reality. Suspects are instructed on the details of the crimes they have committed and are told what exactly they must say in their statements during the investigation.

Usually, the lawyer brought in by the relatives is granted access to the suspect only after the suspect has signed a confession. Even if the lawyer knows about the unlawful methods to which his client has been subjected, he often will not report this cruel treatment, fearing for his own safety. Some individuals do resolve to stand up to this system, but their petitions are rejected, and appeals to the General Prosecutor, the Commissioner for Human Rights, and Duma deputies go without attention.

It is the confession of the accused, in which he incriminates himself, which is the primary evidence of his guilt.

A lawyer is unlikely to be able to help his client at the stage of courtroom investigation if his client has incriminated himself under torture during the preliminary investigation. Even if the matter is taken up by a court and jury, lawyers and defendants are prevented to discuss in front of the jury that the confession was obtained by torturing the defendant. Without this knowledge, it is difficult for jurors to arrive at a fair finding.

Even when the application of violence to the accused is brought into the court's investigation, the court is incapable of discovering falsifications or of making a proper assessment of the violation of the law as it relates to the accused. Thus, the court cannot make a fair sentencing in the matter.

It is very difficult to document and authenticate instances of torture in provisional detention facilities, since independent doctors are not allowed to see the suspect. It is very difficult to obtain independent medical examinations.

Specialists from the International Committee of Red Cross do not visit suspects in provisional detention facilities. It was explained to Memorial staff by representatives of the organization in Ingushetia that "in 2004 the International Committee of Red Cross encountered problems which impeded this kind of activity from being undertaken in accordance with the standard criteria of the organization. As a result, the International Committee of Red Cross has had to temporarily cease visiting detainees."

In such a system, there are few chances for the guilty to be brought to justice and the innocent to be acquitted. Petitions to federal oversight agencies are forwarded to the oversight agencies of the republic, and are tabled by the very people who seek to conceal the violence and arbitrariness of law-enforcement agencies and special services.

In cases when security services fear they may encounter armed resistance, special operations are planned from the beginning such that the suspects are killed on the spot. Not a single one of the widely known and influential fighters was taken alive, even though they could have provided investigators with valuable information. In such cases the lives of a large number of people are invariably placed in imminent danger, since members of the suspect's family, other people living in the building, and residents of neighboring homes are never evacuated.

"Counter-terrorism operations" conducted in this way have the gravest of consequences.

The most evident conclusion is that the cruel treatment of detainees and arrestees during the preliminary investigation inevitably leads to judicial mistakes. We do not assert that none of the abductees in Ingushetia did not participate in the armed units resisting the Russian state. However, in a civilized state, suspects can be detained or arrested only on a lawful basis, investigations should be carried out within procedural norms, and the guilt of the accused can be determined only by a court. Otherwise justice is replaced by arbitrariness and reprisals, the victims of which are invariably innocent people.

The second consequence is already known to us from Chechnya: these "counter-terrorism" measures destabilize the situation and only strengthen the position of the terrorist underground. News of the cruelty of investigations and judicial arbitrariness becomes immediately known across the republic. The terrorist underground is provided with a recruitment base and the chance to attract those who have suffered themselves or who want to avenge their relatives. For others the motive to take up arms may be one of personal protest against the arbitrariness of the security services. Many residents of Ingushetia, in conversations with representatives of Memorial, have asserted that the magnitude of the fighters raid on 21-21 June is explained namely by this effect--as an answer to the violence of law-enforcement agencies on the territory of Ingushetia during 2003 and 2004.

Today the grave foundations for a civil war are being laid. Ingushetia is a small republic and the "Ingushization" of the conflict could happen very quickly. In any case, the intra-civilian antagonisms which have been ignited in the republics seized by this conflict will be doing their destructive work across the entire North Caucasus for many years to come.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic

Since the end of the nineties at the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic (KBR) a confrontation has been established between the official Muslim priesthood (united in the Clerical Department of Moslems of the Republic – CDM) and communities (“Jamaats”) which are not under the control of the CDM and whose overall strength reached some thousand people. At least a part of the “Jamaats” took positions of Islamic fundamentalism.

At the same time in the republic a terrorist underground was formed under active influence from outside – especially on the part of extremist parts of Chechen armed formations led by Shamil Basaev – and based on the ideas of Islamic political fundamentalism. Terrorists committed a series of attacks on the territory of the KBR. In particular, in December 2004 a great number of weapons were stolen from the arsenal of the Republican Department of Drug Control, some officials were killed and the building was set on fire. Shortly after, a part of the weapons turned out to be at the disposal of Shamil Basaev.

It wouldn’t be true to equate the cells of the terrorist underground with the “Jamaats” who openly exist and whose leaders repeatedly denounced violence and terror and appealed to the authorities to step into dialogue and cooperation. However, in the course of the “fight against extremism and terrorism” republican power departments, in particular the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), carried out reprisals against a wide circle of members of the “Jamaats”. As reasons for the reprisals couldn’t only serve extremists acts as such but also the wearing of traditional Islamic clothing or the regular visit of a mosque by a person. The “fight against extremism” changed into a fight against believing Muslims. The CDM drew up a “list of unreliable Muslims” and passed it to the MOI. This led to a radicalization of the “Jamaats” and made it only easier for the emissaries of terror to find new recruits among those people professing to fundamental Islam.

Until September 2003 there hasn’t been a wide-ranging practice of persecution – there were only single cases of persecution of Muslims in the KBR: the closing of a mosque in 2002 in Chegem and in 2003 in Nartkala and in the settlement Altud.

After the unsuccessful attempt to detain Shamil Basaev in Baksan on August 24th 2003 the situation changed and wide-scale repressions began.

Thus, since September 2003 - according to an order of the MOI of Kabardino-Balkaria – all mosques opened for the holding of the prayer for 15 to 20 minutes, some of the mosques only on Fridays. On September 14th 2003 at two places in Nalchik (Musov and Sovetskaya Street) altogether about 60 believers were detained during a collective prayer. They were taken to police departments where protocols about allegedly offered resistance to policemen were drawn up. The court quickly imposed ten days administrative arrest on them. In the course of this time the prisoners were jeered, beaten, stand for a long time face to a wall and their beards were cut. In the same month in Baksan during a prayer policemen burst into a mosque and detained about 15 people, took them to the department and ordered to drink alcoholic drinks. Those who refused were led out in the yard, put on the asphalt and beaten with legs and batons. Afterwards, the prisoners were cut off beards and sheared crosses at the back of their head.

On April 9th 2003 in the Elbrus and Chegem area unknown armed people in camouflage and masks abducted 16 believing Muslims and brought them out of the territory of the KBR. According to their words they were tortured and beaten for three days and demanded to tell about connections with religious extremists. Then, they were thrown out of cars at the territory of neighbouring subjects of the Russian Federation. As cleared up afterwards only two of these 16 abductees were on the “list of the unreliable”.

In September 2004 in Nalchik five mosques were closed and since then there is only one mosque which opens for believers on the basis of a strict time-table defined by the authorities.

On April 2nd 2005 a group of believing female students wearing Muslim clothing met to study the Koran in a lecture room of the Kabardino-Balkarian State University. All of them were unlawfully detained by policemen and taken to the department of the police where they were kept for six hours and became subject to rough handling and humiliation.

The next wave of persecution of believing Muslims followed the terror act in Beslan. At that time in the republic the first case of death of a prisoner was stated. Detained on September 27th 2004 R. D. Tsakoev was taken to the Office for Combating Organized Crime of Nalchik. After two days he was found in grave state at the outskirts of the city and taken to the intensive care unit where he died on October 4th. According to the official version after the interrogation Tsakoev has been released from the office in normal physical state.

A still larger scale of persecution of Muslims was reached after the attack on the arsenal of the Republican Department for Drug Control in December 2004. The “Jamaats” were driven into underground and their leaders were exposed to search.

On June 20th 2005 E. M. Gasieva showing up on the street with a Muslim headscarf was brutally beaten by a policeman. A criminal procedure was opened but shortly after the Office of Public Prosecutor closed it because of “absence of an element of crime”. The decision of closing the procedure has been declared unlawful by the Nalchik City Court. Despite the obviousness of the case the investigation continues to date and the beating policeman continues working at the police.

On October 13th 2005 in Nalchik an armed attack occurred on a state establishment. According to official information during the fighting 35 members of the law-enforcement agencies and 95 attacking persons (most of them either participants of the terrorist underground or members of the “Jamaats”) were killed.

In the second half of October in many settlements of the republic “assemblies of the inhabitants and labour collectives” which were organized by the authorities were carried out. In the presidiums of these assemblies were local heads of the FSB, of the Office of Public Prosecutor and of the agencies of the interior. The assemblies decided to banish behind the borders of the republic the members of the families of the assailants of October 13th, all people professing to “untraditional Islam”, immigrants from the Chechen Republic and so on. Only in result of the scandal raised by human rights organisations republican authorities repudiated their “decisions”.

After the defence of this attack broad detentions followed and many prisoners became subject to beating and torture. According to official information 80 people were arrested. There is good cause to assume that the detained are beaten and tortured. The arrested Zaur Psanukaev died - the Office of Public Prosecutor confirms that he jumped out of the window of the building of the Office for Combating Organized Crime (DOC) although windows are trellised there. On photographs of the detainees which fell into the disposition of relatives and journalists traces of fighting can be seen. The lawyers of the detainees L. Dorogova and I. Komissarova announced that in result of torture their clients are in grave physical state and demanded to carry out a forensic medical examination. After that these lawyers have been removed from the conduct of the case by the Office of Public Prosecutor.

The results of the in that way conducted investigation of the criminal case concerning the attack on the state establishment of Nalchik will hardly be perceived with trust by the society.

Meanwhile, there is no use waiting for pacification in the republic without a serious, objective and overall investigation of both the circumstances leading to the growth of extremism in the KBR and the attack itself.

***

Conclusions and Recommendations

Today, it is evident that violence, tension and gross and massive human rights violations are effectively spreading to enflame the entire Northern Caucasus. The problems that for a number of years used to be localized within Chechnya, are now relevant in other republics of the Northern Caucasus. The situation is especially aggravating in Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. While there are some major differences in the respective situations in those republics, it stands true for all of them that in order to reduce the risk of eruptions of violence and avoid further distabilization, the President and the Government of the Russian Federation must undertake effective measures to stop massive and systemic human rights violations, particularly those perpetrated by Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service officials.

Such measures must include but not be limited to the following:

• Carrying out adequate investigation into cases of human rights violations and bringing the perpetrators to accountability.

• Having the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation conduct a well-rounded review of the activities of enforcement agencies and procuracy bodies in the territory of Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, and other subjects of the Russian Federation in the Northern Caucasus. In particular it is essential that the Prosecutor General’s Office looks into all cases relevant to participation of individuals in illegal armed formations, which have been investigated in those republics, and send for re-investigation and re-trial those cases where there is evidence of torture and forced confessions.

• Putting an end to the widespread practice of “temporary disappearances” of detained persons. In order to decrease the risk of torture as well as in order to guarantee the legal rights of the family members of the detained, it is essential to ensure that relatives of the detained are speedily informed on the whereabouts of the detained.

• Instructing members of federal and local enforcement bodies and security services through about the absolute necessity to respect and observe human rights within the framework of their activities as well as about the accountability for following criminal orders of superior instances and servicemen.

• Reviewing the activities and competence of personnel of federal and local enforcement bodies and security services and ensuring that their activities are in full compliance with relevant legislation of the Russian Federation.

• Proving adequate legal and judicial protection and due compensations to victims of human rights violations.

• Effectively guaranteeing access to places of temporary and pre-trial detention for international humanitarian organizations, including the ICRC, in order to male prisoner visitation possible on conditions acceptable to those organizations.

• Cooperating with the human rights protection mechanisms and agencies of the Council of Europe and the United Nations, including the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Commission and the treaty bodies of the Council of Europe and the UN.

• Effectively cooperating the European Court on Human Rights in connection with implementing the ECtHR rulings on the level of individual and general measures and guaranteeing security of applicants from the Chechen republic, their family members and their representatives at ECtHR.

• Extending the necessary assistance to Russian and international human rights organizations in their human rights monitoring work in the Northern Caucasus. Cooperating with such organization in eliminating the climate of impunity and improving the human rights situation in the region.

• Ensuring the compliance of the state activities within the frames of the flight against terrorism, both on the level of normative acts and on the level of practices, to the international human rights standards and the international humanitarian law, including the European Convention for Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Geneva Conventions, and the Council of Europe Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism.

We respectfully call on the European Union to support the recommendations above and raise them in the course of the human rights consultations with the Russian Federation.