Human Rights Center "Memorial"

The Chechen Republic: Consequences of “Chechenization” of the conflict

A detailed analysis of the situation described in the report by the Human Rights Center “Memorial”, Center “Demos’, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Norwegian Helsinki Committee «In a Climate of Fear. “Political Process” and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya»

According to the representatives of Russian authorities, the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic is over, the process of political regulation of the conflict is finished, and the republic has been returned into the legal space of Russian Federation.

In reality, however, behind the façade of “regulation” the armed conflict continues, although its forms have changed. Gross mass violations of human rights continue; these violations are carried out by both sides of the conflict – the armed groups of separatist fighters, and, primarily, by the forces under control of the Russian Federation’s federal center. Over the past few years, the conflict has been “chechenized” – new power structures have been formed, manned by local residents, ethnic Chechens. These structures now have the considerable authority to carry out illegal violence.

Any real political process is impossible under the conditions of continuing state terror. The result is that the Chechen Republic has no political power elected by the population, no power that would be considered legitimate at least by a considerable portion of the population.

Due to the “chechenization” of the conflict, over the last three years the methods and tactics of the power structures have also changed on the territory of the Republic.

Over the years 2003-2005, new power structures made up of ethnic Chechens continued to be formed. Apart from police forces, specialized groups are created for the purpose of fighting the armed separatists. It is to these groups that the “right” to carry out illegal violence is delegated.

The people that the members of these structures get their hands on “disappear” for the rest of the world. They are kept in illegal prisons and are not registered as detained or arrested; they are tortured and thus forced to sign “confessions”, later used to manufacture criminal cases. About half of the kidnapped individuals later disappear without a trace.

At the beginning of the year 2004 a new method is used to force the armed rebels to surrender – their family members are taken hostage or threatened with death.

The number of “cleaning measures” (“zachistka”, when governmental forces raid an area and eliminate or detain all those suspected of supporting the armed rebel fighters) decreased abruptly at the beginning of 2003. However, in August of 2004 it increased again, although it never reached the old level. In 2004 the brutality and mass character of all “cleanings” also decreased. However, the brutality of some of the “cleanings” in 2005 can be compared to those of the first years of the war, and the events in the village of Borozdinovskaya can serve as an example of that.

The problem of “disappearances” of people in Chechnya is still very urgent and serious. In most cases, the “disappeared” individuals have been kidnapped by the members of Russian Federation’s armed forces. The human rights activists do note a certain decrease in the number of registered kidnappings; however, this decrease is not as significant as stated by the official representatives of the government. This “decrease” can be connected in part to the reign of “latent violence” in Chechnya; this violence is registered neither by human rights organizations nor by law enforcement agencies.

Investigation of crimes against the peaceful civilian population in the conflict zone is dominated by selective impunity.

The criminal cases against separatist fighters are investigated and heavy sentences are passed regardless to the gravity of the crime. However, things are very different in cases of crimes committed by representatives of federal or pro-federal forces. The official statistics are falsified. In most cases where the participation of representatives of these departments is suspected, the investigation is stopped “as it is impossible to find the persons to be persecuted”. Only an insignificant minority of cases is brought to court. The overwhelming majority of defendants receive symbolic punishment for serious crimes.

Often the separatist fighters purposely attack civilians or unarmed representatives of state authorities. Some of the groups opposing the federal power use obviously terrorist methods. After the murder of A. Maskhadov, the influence of terrorists and Muslim fundamentalists has increased among the forces opposing the Russian Federation’s power in Chechnya.

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The government of Russian Federation claims that the fighting in Chechen Republic (CR) has been ceased and that peaceful life is establishing in the region. The official version is that the governing structures have been formed as a result of elections and that the internal affairs agencies are functioning, as well as public prosecutor offices and courts in which individuals can protect their rights.

The monitoring of the situation in CR, carried out by human rights organizations, reveals a different state of affairs. The exterior signs of “returning to peaceful life” – the imitation of democratic elections and the transfer of plenary powers to local authorities – have, over the past three years, been hiding the process of “chechenization” of the conflict.

The “chechenization” process has not lead to pacification in CR; on the opposite, it has promoted bitterness of both sides of the conflict, as well as increase of fear and feeling of vulnerability among the peaceful population. The conflict has gained a new dimension – intra-Chechen – and it will be much harder to “extinguish” than the Russia-Chechnya confrontation.

The political process is being imitated in Chechnya. The CR constitution referendum in March 2003, the elections of President of CR in October 2003 and August 2004 were accompanied by outrageous mass violations and falsification during all stages: the election campaign, the voting process and counting of ballots. In the course of the parliamental campaign 2005 in CR representatives of the present power elites were co-opted by approbation of their leaders into the lists of all federal parties including those of democratic orientation. Perhaps for this reason, the election campaign before the elections of CR Parliament in November 2005 electoral legislation was basically not violated. However, on the election day, the representatives of human rights organizations noted a significant difference in information on the number of voters presented by heads of local election committees and by observers representing political parties.

Any real political process is impossible under the conditions of continuing state terror. The continuing violence in Chechnya left no chances for organizing and carrying out free and fair elections in November 2005.

The parliament elections in CR were carried out against a background of grave crimes, such as extra-judicial executions, kidnappings, enforced disappearances, tortures, unlawful detentions, taking of hostages, human traffic and marauding. And most of these crimes were committed by the state authorities that initiated the plebiscite. The elections took place in the atmosphere of fear. The civilian population was so scared that only a few individuals were brave enough to speak about violence against them and their family members.

As a result, the representatives of political parties participating in the election were either unwilling or afraid to raise in essence the issues of safety and security, which are crucial for Chechnya’s population. The safety issues include the lawless violence of armed groups that are formally part of the governmental authorities, the complete lack of control over such groups and the state’s incapacity to ensure safety of the population, as well as observance of law and order. The most important issue for Chechnya – the question of finding a peaceful solution for the region – was not raised by any of the parties.

Over the years 2003-2005, new power structures made up of ethnic Chechens continued to be formed.

The republican ministry of internal affairs was created, numbering an estimated 14,000 men. The majority of the policemen are involved in ensuring public order and protection of various state institutions. Usually they do not directly participate in carrying out raids against Chechen fighters. This task is implemented by special units consisting of ethnic Chechens which either formally belong to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense, or function outside the official ministries. According to the estimations of human rights organizations, in the years 2004-2005 the absolute majority of grave human rights abuses committed in Chechnya on behalf of the state were committed by members of these units.

The largest military group manned by ethnic Chechens is under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov. It is made up of many separate groups operating in different districts of Chechnya. At one point they were all united as the so-called Security Service (“SB”)¹. SB was initially created as personal security guard of the Moscow-appointed head of Chechen administration, Akhmat Kadyrov and didn’t have any legal status. Over three years it grew into a powerful military formation. SB was commanded by Akhmat Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan. Some of the sub-units of SB were legalized in 2004-2005 as parts of different structures of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs. Many of SB were ex-separatist fighters – those who had been wounded, captured or disappointed in the war and tried to use amnesties as a way to return to peaceful life. Instead, they were offered to join the Security Service, often under torture or threats to eliminate their relatives. The fighters who refused to join “disappeared” after becoming victims of extra-judicial executions. This practice continued even after the period of validity of the latest amnesty was long over.

After Akhmat Kadyrov was killed in a bomb blast on May 9 2004, the Security Service was formally liquidated, and Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed vice-prime minister, responsible for the security bloc. Thus began the process of a much harsher integration of the SB into the system of Russian law enforcement agencies and security authorities. Gradually, all Ministry of Internal Affairs of CR structures were transferred under the control of Kadyrov’s people. In particular, the members of the ex-Security Services formed the second Road Patrol regiment of the police (PPSM-2), named after Akhmat Kadyrov. At the same time, Adam Demelkhanov, Akhmat Kadyrov’s bodyguard, headed the so-called “oil regiment”, also formed of the members of the ex-Security Service. Formally, these structures have nothing to do with “combating terrorism”. PPSM-2 is aimed at ensuring security in the streets of the towns and in public places, while the “Oil Regiment” is to guard the oil refineries, oil pipes, oil products and other industrial sites. However both regiments participate in the detention of people and are deployed in operations against armed separatist troops.

In 2005 the so-called Anti-Terrorist Center began its functions; it is not formally part of any of the power and law enforcement structures that already exist. This structure unites a number of small groups that are also controlled by Ramzan Kadyrov. The authorities are currently discussing the possibility of legalizing the Center as part of the internal armed force of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

All of the above-mentioned armed groups are still referred to as “kadyrovtsy”, both by the population and the members of these groups.

A significant number of members of these groups are people with criminal past. In some cases a whole detachment is made up of people who had committed criminal offence and economic crimes in the period between wars. Thus, the “kadyrovtsy” group in the village of Gikalovsky is under the command of Sultan Patsaev, who used to be a fighter in the Gelaev group. After the end of the first Chechen campaign he robbed oil wells and participated in kidnapping people for ransom.

The leaders of the Chechen law enforcement agencies also use blood feuds and vendettas between families to their own advantage. Thus, in November 2002 Lema Salmanov shot two people in front of his house in the village of Mairtup. The two men came to him, upon a previous agreement, to collect a money debt for a “Kamaz” vehicle that had been bought from them. Later the brother of one of the murdered men and the relatives of the other joined a separatist fighter group. But Salmanov was charged with the formation of a “kadyrovtsy” group in his village and afterwards he was assigned the command of anti-terrorist center created in the district. Today he has been deposed from office because of the extremely cruel treatment of detainees and the completely unmotivated use of weapons against the civil population.

Apart from the “kadyrovtsy” and groups controlled by them, there are Chechen battalions active in the CR. These are Battalions “Vostok” (“East”) and “Zapad” (“West”), both part of the 42^nd Mechanized Infantry Division of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. A certain percentage of soldiers serving in this division are not ethnic Chechens, but fighters assigned from other regions of Russia.

The core of the “Vostok” Battalion (“yamadaevtsy”) consists of several dozens of fighters from the “Second Battalion of the Ichkeria National Guards”, who changed sides in the beginning of the second war and joined the federal forces. The commander of the battalion is Sulim Yamadaev. During the first Chechen war the brothers Sulim, Khalid (more widely known as Ruslan) and Dzabrail Yamadaev fought against the federal forces.

The “Vostok” Battalion is responsible for combating Chechen resistance in the mountainous Vedensky and Nozhaj-Yurtovsky districts and on the parts of the plain adjacent to them. The personnel of this battalion are known to have participated in the abductions of people.

The “Zapad” Battalion (“kakievtsy”) is headed by Said-Magomed Kakiev, who has been fighting against separatists from the beginning of the 1990’s. The core of this battalion is the Chechens who initially opposed the idea of independence from Russia and supported the federal forces even before the first war.

Over the past two years officers from the above-mentioned structures have taken basically all the key posts in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of CR.

In their activities these structures use the illegal methods.

People who end up in the hands of the personnel of these agencies “disappear” for the outside world. They are kept in illegal prisons, unregistered as detained or arrested in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation. There they are tortured and thus forced to sign “confessions”, which are later used to fabricated criminal court cases; another way of making detainees testify is threatening them with elimination of their family members². Formally the arrest or detention is documented only from the moment when the detainee is being transferred to FSB or Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In 2005 the republican security agencies widely practiced illegal detainments of people for a period from 24 hours to 10 days, with the aim of receiving information about local rebels and their supporters. In the detainment people are subjected to interrogation under torture; after the necessary information has been extracted from them they are “dumped” near the surrounding villages or released to their relatives for a ransom. Before release, the detainees are warned that unless they want a second detainment with subsequent “disappearance” they should keep quiet about what happened to them. Some of the detainees under torture and threats are forced to cooperate with the security agencies. In the majority of cases the victims do not turn to law enforcement agencies for help and refuse to provide information to human rights organizations³. In cases of kidnappings by republican security agencies that are made up of ethnic Chechens the policemen advise relatives to wait before they file a claim, lest they should harm the kidnapped person and create additional problems for the police or themselves. Thus, the “voluntary” refusal to turn to justice happens already at the initial stage of application to the police or the prosecutor’s office.

Since the beginning of 2004, threats of eliminating family members and taking relatives as hostages are methods actively used to force separatist fighters to surrender.

In his speech in the State Duma on October 20, 2004, Prosecutor General of Russian Federation, Vladimir Ustinov, proposed to legalize “counter-hostage taking” and “simplified legal proceedings” in relation to terrorists: “Detaining relatives of terrorists during a terrorist act would certainly help us save people”. Despite the applause of Duma deputies that greeted this proposition of the Prosecutor General, no legal acts followed. But it seems like this speech, broadcasted on television, was taken by the security and law enforcement agencies in Chechnya as a guide to action.

In the year 2005 and the beginning of 2006 “Memorial” received appeals from people who had spent several weeks to ten months in captivity, as hostages. Some of them named the armed formation that kept them and provided detailed accounts of the premises and conditions of their detainment; however, they refused to turn to law enforcement for justice.

The most notorious case is the abduction of relatives of Aslan Maskhadov.

On December 3 and December 28, 2004, 7 relatives of A. Maskhadov were taken by force from their homes and driven off to an unknown location: his sister, Buchu Alievna Abdulkadyrova, b. 1937; his brother, Lecha Alievich Maskhadov, b. 1936; his brother, Lema Alievich Maskhadov, b. 1950; his nephew, Ikhvan Vakhaevich Magomedov, b. 1970; his niece, Khadizhat Vakhaevna Satueva, b. 1964; his nephew-in-law, Usman Ramzanovich Satuev, b. 1958; and a distant relative, Adam Abdul-Karimovich Rashiev, b. 1950.

All the circumstances of the kidnapping and the witnesses’ testimony point to the fact that the crime was committed by “kadyrovtsy”. The prosecutor’s office started criminal proceedings to investigate the fact of kidnapping. However, there was no information on the fate of the kidnapped for over more than six months.

On May 31, 2005, almost three months after the death of A. Maskhadov, all the kidnapped relatives were released. According to the victims, for the whole period of detention they were all kept together in a concrete chamber (3 by 3 meters in size) without any furniture. There was a small barred window in the ceiling. They weren’t accused of anything, there were no interrogations, and they were taken outside only to let them go to the toilet. The victims were able to notice that the place of their imprisonment was located in a rather vast territory, surrounded by a fence. There were many armed individuals there, speaking mostly in Chechen.

On May 30, 2005, a man in civilian clothes entered their cell and told them that they are being released. On the same day they were allowed to wash – for the first time in five months.

On the next morning the victims were taken to their homes, with their eyes tied.

On July 27, 2005, Deputy Prosecutor General of Russian Federation, N.I. Shepel, made a statement at a conference titled “Strengthening of law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order in Chechen Republic”, held in Kislovodsk upon the initiative of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. He said that “Maskhadov’s relatives were released as a result of a special operation organized by the governmental forces”. However, at the same time he stated that “it was impossible to identify the kidnappers”.

The criminal investigation of the kidnapping of seven Maskhadov relatives was suspended “due to the impossibility of identifying persons to be called to account as defendants”.

This case can serve as an apt illustration of the fact that the prosecutor’s office and the law enforcement agencies do not want to investigate such kidnappings, even though the kidnappers are known.

Due to the “chechenization” of the conflict, over the past two years the methods of carrying out the operations have changed.

Since the end of 2003, the number of “cleanings” of villages and towns decreased abruptly, and then started increasing again in August of 2004, although never reaching the old level. Thus, in 2005 there were 27 “cleanings” in the villages and towns of the Urus-Martan district.

Sometimes the local and federal security and law enforcement agencies carry out the “cleanings” together; sometimes they act separately. Usually during the “cleanings” the legislation of Russian Federation and the local regulations for such special operations are not fully observed. The armed individuals almost never introduce themselves upon entering a house; they do not state which governmental agency they represent. Most often their uniforms do not carry any insignia that would specify their rank, status and affiliation, not to mention the breastplates that police officers are required to wear during any operations, according to instructions and orders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Often the faces of men carrying out “cleanings” are hidden beneath masks. The numerous statements by the highest officials of CR about the ban on wearing masks during special operations were not taken into account. Often during “cleanings” vehicles without license plates are used.

In 2004 the brutality and mass character of violations of human rights during all “cleanings” decreased. However, the brutality of some of the “cleanings” in 2005 can be compared to those of the first years of the war.

In the afternoon of June 4, 2005, in the village of Borozdinovskaya of Shelkovsky district, the personnel of Special-purpose “Vostok” Battalion carried out a special operation for “detainment of 11 local residents, suspected of cooperation with separatist fighters.” (RIA “News”, 06.06.2005)

At 3 p.m. two armed troop carriers and at least fifteen automobiles carrying armed men entered the village. The men were wearing gray police and camouflage uniform. They broke into the houses and forced all men to get into the cars. They were then brought to the local school, ordered to lie on the ground with their faces down and to cover heads with their shirts. All men, including the elderly, the handicapped and the adolescents, were severely beaten with gun butts and kicked with boots. The detainees were kept on the ground almost until 10 p.m., regardless of the pouring rain. From what the security services shouted out, the villagers understood that they were accused of killing the forest guard and of the attempt on the life of the head of local administration – the events that took place two days prior to this “cleaning”.

11 names were read out from a list and these men were taken somewhere; since then they have disappeared without a trace⁴.

At around 10 p.m. the rest of the men were forced into the gym of the school; there the servicemen again beat them up with sticks and walked on their backs. Then the servicemen ordered their detainees to remain where they were and left.

Two houses were burned down at Lenin Street (# 9 and 11); the houses belonged to Nazirbek Magomedov and his son Said. Also, the house of Kamil and Zarakhan Magomedov was burned, as well as the house of Magomaz Magomadov, aged 77. The wife and the daughter of Magomadov were taken outside, but the old man was burned alive inside the house.

After the servicemen left, it turned out that not only the men, but also several cars disappeared. None of the military servicemen who carried out the operation identified themselves; however, the local residents recognized in one of the officers a fighter of the “Vostok” Battalion, who is also the leader of the local branch of “United Russia” political party.

A criminal investigation of the arsons, murder and kidnapping was started by the prosecutor’s office. The investigation proved that on that day the personnel of “Vostok” Battalion carried out the “cleaning” without orders or permission, on their own will. One of the “Vostok” officers received a conditional sentence “for exceeding his official powers”. As of this date, nobody else has been punished for the crimes committed in Borozdinovskaya. The fate of the disappeared persons remains unknown.

The local law enforcement agencies most often do not need to carry out large-scale “cleanings”; as a rule they act more locally and selectively.

A typical example of such a special operation would be the events in the Novye Atagi village in September of 2005.

All throughout the month of September people were disappearing from the village; most of these disappearances were relatively short-term, accompanied by very severe beatings and very harsh and brutal treatment, and sometimes even elaborate tortures of the kidnapped individuals. A few of the detainees were only 12, 13 and 14 years old.

During the nights of 12-13 and 13-14 of September, officers of the law enforcement agencies kidnapped a number of local residents, including Ruslan Salaudinovich Khalaev, b. 1984; Sharudin Badrudinovich Khalaev, b. 1978; Magomed Isaevich Elikhanov, b. 1985; Apti Edilov, 18 years; Magomed-Zmi Aguev, b. 1987; and Islam Khasinovich Bakalov, b. 1987. According to the families of the seized men, during the special operation, the law enforcement officers were rude, did not identify themselves and did not give any explanations as to why the men were being taken.

The local residents came out with a picket, blocking off a highway that passes by the village. They demanded that the kidnapped men be released. The district prosecutor’s office started proceedings and investigation of a criminal case (violation of Article 127 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation – unlawful restraint of liberty or imprisonment).

On the night of September 17-18, officers of an unknown branch of the law enforcement authorities raided a bakery in Novye Atagi. They smashed equipment and drove away the workers, accusing them of supplying bread to the separatist fighters. On the same night, unknown armed men abducted the village's head of administration, Abdulla Datsaev. He was taken to Shali, the central town of the district. He returned the same day, in the early morning, cruelly beaten. Datsaev called the parents of Elikhanov and insisted that they do not block the road with a picket again.

Over the next few days, most of the kidnapped men were released by their kidnappers after having been severely beaten and tortured. However, four of the Novye Atagi residents (Elikhanov, Aguev, and Ruslan and Sharudin Khalaev) were handed over to the Shali district internal affairs department. The fact that these men were unlawfully imprisoned was obvious, and, nevertheless, the police did not take any measures against the “kadyrovtsy”. On the opposite, the policemen registered the arrest of the men that were handed over to them, since by that time they had been forced, by tortures, to confess committing a number of crimes.

As the result of the previous “cleaning” was not good enough for the security forces, on Friday a large group of armed men arrived at the Novye Atagi mosque during Friday prayers. The group was led by Alambek Yasuev, commander of the PPSM-2 regiment. Yasuev spoke to the residents and stated that his officers and he will continue to use the same methods of action. He threatened those who picketed the road as a protest against abduction of their fellow village residents.

The criminal case of unlawful imprisonment has been under investigation for over six months. Nobody has yet been made accountable for the crime.

The official data on the number of kidnapped and missing persons is rather contradictable and very incomplete. According to the information collected by “Memorial”, in the second half of year 2005 only one third of Chechnya residents that had come to seek the help of human rights activists in cases of kidnapping went on to Ministry of Internal Affairs and prosecutor’s offices.