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Communique on the Second Meeting of Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations and Representatives of State Authorities of the Chechen Republic(Chechen Republic, Village of Znamenskoe, 28 February 2002) The meeting of the Working Group was held on 28 February 2002 in the village of Znamenskoe in the Nadterechny Region of Chechnya, at the Bureau of the Special Presidential Representative for the Protection of Human Rights in Chechnya. The decision to form such a working group, including both representatives of non-governmental organizations and state authorities in Chechnya, was made at the first meeting on 12 January 2002. ****** Representing non-governmental organizations at the Znamenskoe meeting were: Representing state authorities at the meeting were:
****** Agenda for the Meeting:
****** 1 à) At the previous session of the working group, representatives of human rights organizations set forth a series of concrete proposals, with which all representatives of state authorities in attendance agreed:
On 28 February 2002, representatives of Memorial reported to those gathered that, on the request of the Commander of the Unified Forces, V.I. Moltensky, a summary of these recommendations was sent to him by Memorial, the Chechen Committee for National Salvation, and the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society. However not one of these recommendations was implemented in practice during the one and a half months since the previous meeting. As in the past, numbers on many armored vehicles are either missing altogether or are covered over with mud. As in the past, representatives of federal forces fail to present themselves when entering buildings in the course of special operations. In only one instance – the "mopping up" operation in the village of Stariye Atagi (28 January – 4 February) – did a representative of the prosecutor's office present the head of the local administration with a list of local detainees. As before, people detained by representatives of federal forces are disappearing. In response, the First Deputy Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic explained that in those instances when the prosecutor's office is informed about a special operation being conducted, an exhaustive list of detainees is prepared as a matter of course. However the directive on cooperation between regional and military prosecutors and the command of the Unified Forces does not provide for the provision of such lists to heads of local administrations. In the future steps could be taken to put this into practice, but this would require a supporting order from the Commander of the Unified Forces – a document that currently does not exist. Responding to the statement by representatives of non-governmental organizations, the Acting Commander in the Chechen Republic declared that an accompanying order from the Commander backing up the suggested measures already exists and that representatives of human rights organizations could even receive a written excerpt from this order. However in the course of the discussion, it became clear that the Acting Commander had in mind order ¹ 145 of the Acting Commander of the Unified Forces (May 2001), which the representatives of human rights organizations have long been aware of. The order requires that all detainees during the course of special operations be registered and that military servicemen and representatives of the prosecutor's office coordinate their actions; it does not speak to the measures described above which were proposed by human rights activists. In response, the Acting Commander in the Chechen Republic declared that "in correspondence with the statute (ustav), all military equipment is to have a number… It's not necessary to issue an order for the sun to rise, because it will rise anyway. Therefore the number is already there." Police employees are supposed to conduct checks of passport rules and are automatically supposed to present themselves upon entering a building; correspondingly it's not necessary to issue an order to this effect. As far as lists of detainees are concerned, these lists are contained within the documentation for special operations and are kept in the military offices; any person who wishes to may request them to be provided. Representatives of human rights organizations noted that the Acting Commander himself had arrived at the meeting in an armored vehicle without a clear number and was demonstrating his obvious unwillingness to adopt even the most basic practical measures aimed at lessening the number of violations of rights occurring in the course of special operations. Representatives of the prosecutor's office (both regional and military) reported that the issue of bringing order to the conduct of special operations was discussed on 10 February 2002 at a meeting of the Regional Operations Staff for Counterterrorist Operations. In fulfilling the decisions from this meeting, representatives of the prosecutor's office, the military command and the Unified Forces are currently working out directives for conducting special operations. These directives should be prepared by April-May of this year. The recommendations set forth by human rights activists could potentially be among the standards included in these directives. In addition, it is anticipated that responsibility for violations committed in the course of special operations will be turned over to the commander of the operation. Upon completion of the special operation, homeowners and the head of the administration will turn over a written document that indicates the presence or absence of any complaints. (The possibility of such a standard being included in the directives generated sharp negative reactions from human rights activists). In response to a question by representatives of human rights organizations about whether the local population could be informed about the points of the directives which concern the relations between federal forces and local residents, representatives of the prosecutor's office responded affirmatively. All the same, representatives of human rights organizations recorded the fact that previously agreed upon points were not yet being fulfilled. Representatives of the prosecutor's office expressed the opinion that "work is fulfilling agreements is on-going." 1 b) In relation to the first agenda point, representatives of the prosecutor's office provided answers to a number of inquiries which were put before them at the previous meeting (12 January). In relation to an inquiry about widespread violations of human rights by representatives of federal forces during special operations ("mopping up operations") in the village of Tsotsin-Yurt (30 December 2001 – 3 January 2002), the First Deputy Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic reported that the prosecutor's office had opened 7 criminal cases into robberies against local residents. In addition, 3 separate criminal cases were being conducted on "disappearances" and murders of detainees. It is necessary to note that on 12 January the Commander of the Unified Forces, V.I. Moltensky, stated that he had led the operation in Tsotsin-Yurt and that the information presented by human rights activists about the crimes committed during this operation was "not credible." At the time Chernov, the Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic, said that he didn't know about these facts, but promised to look into them. In relation to an inquiry about widespread violations of human rights by representatives of federal forces during special operations ("mopping up operations") in the village of Avtura (1-3 December 2001), the First Deputy Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic reported that General Bogdanovsky had led this operation and that criminal cases had been opened against military servicemen from the internal troops on the basis of articles 126 (kidnapping) and 162 (robbery) of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. On 15 January 2002 these cases were handed over from the Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic to the Military Prosecutor of Shalinsky Region. Thus far, none of the military servicemen has been brought to justice. In relation to the disappearance of 7 people in Urus-Martan region, 3 members of the Cherukhanov family in the village of Oiskhar, and Vadilov in the village of Valerik, representatives of the prosecutor's office reported that the inquiries had been handed over to the regional prosecutor's office and that work was being conducted on them. The location of these individuals had not yet been determined. 2) In relation to the second agenda item, representatives of human rights organizations confirmed that there has been no special legal regime introduced into the territory of the Chechen Republic that annuls the Criminal and Criminal Trial Codices of the Russian Federation and no special places for detaining civilians are provided for beyond normal temporary isolation units. Moreover, a legal vacuum has been intentionally created in the territory of Chechnya; thanks to the arbitrary and widespread use of the Law "On the Battle with Terrorism," a special regime limiting the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens is in effect here. The widespread detentions of civilians by federal forces under the conditions of a legal vacuum and effective absence of control couldn't not give rise to widespread violations of human rights: beatings, humilitation, torture and disappearances. Behind the façade of an official system of centers for holding, questioning and investigating detainees, an unofficial system of unlawful detention sites exists inside military compounds etc. In the opinion of representatives of non-governmental organizations, it will be possible to overcome the gross and widespread violations of human rights during "mopping up operations" and "filtrations" only by bringing them into conformity with the standards of Russian legislation – particularly the Criminal Trial Code, which formally continues to be valid in the so-called zone of "counterterrorist operations." Any "special operation" in populated areas should be preceded by the creation of an operation plan with clear indications of the zone of responsibility for various subdivisions. Representatives of the prosecutor's office should be acquainted with this plan before the start of the special operation. The leader of the operation should inform representatives of the prosecutor's office in writing about any changes made to the plan in the course of operation. Upon completion of the "special operation," the plan and detailed report on the carrying out of the special operation should be provided to the prosecutor's office by the individual providing leadership of the "special operation." If the human rights of detainees of "special operations to monitor passport rules" are to be observed, it is essential that they be taken to temporary isolation units located at the regional internal affairs branches, or that temporary detention units be introduced that are in conformity with the requirements for detention units, particularly:
It is essential to enlarge the staff of military and regional prosecutor's offices in Chechnya. During "special operations," representatives of the prosecutor's office should constantly be present among the subdivisions carrying out the operation and be in constant contact with the local population. It is also necessary to create special integrated investigative teams comprising employees of the general, military and regional prosecutor's offices, who will lead investigations into instances of disappearances of people detained by federal forces during "special operations" and "targeted checks." Representatives of the prosecutor's office, for their part, agreed that on the whole a clear legal basis has not yet been developed for regulating the conduct of special and even counterterrorist operations. There is a basic Law "On the Battle with Terrorism" that has been adopted in "raw form." For example, the law grants the right to detain individuals for the purpose of verifying their identity, but a time limit for such detentions is not fixed. Therefore a number of other normative acts come into effect: the Code of Administrative Violations, criminal trial legislation, the order of the Russian President "On the Battle with Vagrancy and Begging" and others. At present there are procedural requirements that are observed in relation to individuals that are brought to temporary check points ("filtration points") – completion of protocols about their detention in correspondence with article 122 of the Criminal Trial Code. It is another matter altogether that such points do not correspondend to (and are unlikely ever to correspond to) the requirements made for isolation units. In the course of further discussion, it became clear that the temporary check points ("filtration points") created during the course of special operations do not have any legal basis. There are no statutes regulating their functioning. Representatives of human rights organizations confirmed that far-reaching special operations aimed at discovering individuals participating in unlawful armed formations are, as a rule, accompanied by gross and widespread violations of human rights, kidnappings, disappearances and murders. The so-called "excesses" have taken on a systematic character. Innocent people suffer from these operations first and foremost, and those who are guilty for committing these crimes are punished extremely rarely. In relation to this, it was suggested to abandon far-reaching special operations ("mopping up operations") in populated areas and to switch over exclusively to operations directed against specific criminals. According to the First Deputy Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic, the same proposal was made at the meeting of the Regional Operations Staff of the Counterterrorist Operation on February 10 of this year. However a decision was made to begin working out directives for conducting special operations, while not renouncing them completely. According to the opinion of the Acting Commander in the Chechen Republic, special activities should be conducted exclusively under the leadership of local regional commanders; it is also essential to engage local police and the heads of local administrations in such operations. Such measures significantly lower the probability that illegal actions will be taken in relation to local residents. 3) Representatives of non-governmental organizations and the prosecutor's office expressed opposite evaluations in relation to the third point of the agenda. Human rights activists hold that only a small handful of the many representatives of federal forces committing serious crimes against individuals in Chechnya are ever punished. Three-quarters of the cases opened into disappearances and murders of detainees are suspended "in connection with the impossibility of determining the identity of the accused." Representatives of the prosecutor's office, on the other hand, confirmed the progress that has been made in investigating and preventing similar crimes. In 2001-2002 alone, criminal cases accusing 12 military servicemen of murder were sent to the military prosecutor. In a series of cases, severe sentences were handed down – for example, servicemen were sentenced to 18 and 11 years of imprisonment for murder, to 12 and 9 years for robberies. Representatives of the prosecutor's office and the command of the Unified Forces meet regularly and there are no obstacles in the way of staff of the prosecutor's office carrying out investigations. Just as they did at the first meeting, representatives of human rights organizations raised the question of the responsibility of leaders of special operations for widespread violations of human rights that occur during such operations. This question was raised in particular relation to the responsibility of General Bogdanovsky, who led a whole series of special operations. In response, the Acting Commander of the Chechen Republic said that General Bogdanovsky and Lieutenant Plotnikov are located a great distance from the Chechen Republic. |
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