MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

March 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Information Items

Soviet Ambassador Comments on Berlin: In his March 10 international press conference in East Berlin, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov rejected Western assertions of allied rights in East Berlin. His reported statement that the West has no "military rights" in East Berlin appears to suggest, as noted by Embassy Berlin, that allied military tours to East Berlin may become subject to pressure.

Abrasimov accused the West of 40 violations of the 1971 Quadripartite agreements. He reiterated the standard Soviet position that the Quadripartite agreement applies to West Berlin only and does not mention a "Greater Berlin" which includes the "capital of the GDR."

The press conference was called less than three weeks after GDR party boss Erich Honecker's interview with a West German paper which dealt extensively with Berlin issues. While Abrasimov's legal arguments buttress Honecker's, he appears to have avoided discussing recent GDR initiatives. His conference may have been intended as a subtle reminder to both East and West Germans that the USSR still was the authoritative spokesman for the East on Berlin matters.

The Rhodesia-Botswana Border: A series of recent incidents on the Botswana border have led the Rhodesian government to class Botswana as no longer "neutral." Accordingly, the Rhodesian Operations Coordinating Committee has prohibited the hot pursuit of nationalists fleeing into Botswana and directed that troop movements be kept away from the border areas. The military reportedly fears that well-publicized border incidents occurring during Podgorny's upcoming visit to southern Africa could be used by Botswana to justify calling in the UN.

State Department review completed

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
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Philippine Muslim Insurgency Could Affect U.S. Base Negotiations: The four-year-old Libyan-backed Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines, stilled by a ceasefire in January, is threatening to erupt in renewed hostilities. Marcos has asked the U.S. to expedite deliveries of arms and ammunition for use in the event of renewed conflict. Marcos will be weighing the U.S. response as he prepares to resume U.S. military base negotiations (on which, however, he will not fully focus until the current Muslim dilemma is resolved).

The State Department believes that Marcos may have made the arms request at least in part as a ploy to exploit in U.S. base negotiations. If the U.S. refuses to expedite deliveries, Marcos' negotiating position could harden. Manila is also bitter that the U.S. does not consider the Mutual Defense Treaty relevant to the externally fueled Muslim insurgency. A positive U.S. response, however, might prompt Marcos to be more forthcoming in the negotiations—or, oppositely, could toughen his stance as he gains confidence that he can extract what he wishes from the U.S.

The Philippine military is dependent on U.S. equipment, and Marcos' request may also be in part due to a genuinely felt need for expedited deliveries in light of threatened increases in Libyan aid to the insurgents and unconfirmed but plentiful reports that the Muslims are stockpiling supplies in anticipation of renewed fighting.

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East Asian Attitudes Toward U.S. Normalization with Vietnam: A State Department analysis concludes that all East Asian nations welcome in principle normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam. However, most Southeast Asians are concerned that U.S. aid, trade, and investment might build up Vietnam's capacity for subversion. All countries of the region would be concerned if normalization, combined with other U.S. moves in the area, appeared to signal a sharp decrease in Washington's interest.

The Southeast Asians, in general, believe U.S. relations with Hanoi will:

- -- help balance the Soviet presence in Vietnam and its ambitions in Southeast Asia;
- -- tend to offset any future Chinese effort to expand its influence in the region;
- -- act as a brake on any Vietnamese interest in largescale infiltration or subversion of neighboring states.

At the same time, most Southeast Asians are concerned that U.S. aid, trade and possibly investment in Vietnam will:

- -- result in correspondingly less from the U.S. in the ASEAN area;
- -- be a catalyst for increased Japanese and West European aid, trade, and investment in Vietnam;
- -- strengthen the SRV economically and therefore make it a greater menace to non-communist Southeast Asia.