## THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Information Items

Latin American Reactions to U.S.-Cuban Talks: The reactions of Latin American foreign ministry officials to news of impending U.S.-Cuban talks on fisheries and possibly other issues have varied predictably from approval to apprehension. All express appreciation for being given advance notice. The most enthusiastic was the Mexican foreign secretary. Foreign Minister Lievano of Colombia said that his country, as a friend of the U.S. but one "concerned over issues that not only divide Cuba and the U.S. but also affect us one way or the other," was pleased by the initiative. The foreign ministers of Haiti, Nicaragua, and Guatemala all expressed concern over continuing Cuban support for revolutionary groups. The Bahamian reaction was apprehensive, primarily because of Cuban competition for U.S. tourism. The Dominican foreign secretary termed the dialogue a positive President Balaguer reacted similarly, but noted that Dominican policy toward Cuba would remain unchanged. Panama, El Salvador, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Brazil have given no indication of their views.

Soviet Civil Defense Effort: During the past year the intelligence community has begun an in-depth study of the Soviet civil defense program. Although a comprehensive assessment of the program's potential effectiveness cannot be made at this time, confident judgments on the scope and nature of the program can be made.

-- The program is more than a paper plan, but it is limited in scope and is not being implemented on a crash basis.

--The pattern of shelter construction indicates that the Soviets are placing highest priority on protecting the top political-military leadership and key cadres at certain industrial facilities.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

SANTIZED
Per; Rac Project

ESDN; NLC-

BY NARA DATE 10/3/05

NSA, STATE reviews completed

--The number of shelters detected in various Soviet cities probably can support no more than ten percent of the population, reinforcing the view that protection of the general population is a third-order Soviet priority.

--The Soviets do plan to evacuate most of the general population from the cities, but a successful evacuation would depend on such critical factors as the weather and the distribution of food and other supplies after an attack.

--Soviet heavy industry is still highly concentrated, although light industry has been dispersed somewhat.

--There is little evidence that the Soviets are hardening individual industrial facilities (they are protecting key personnel at some facilities, but not essential equipment and machinery).

In conclusion State believes the growing data based on the Soviet civil defense effort reinforces the view that it is a limited program being implemented gradually to protect the top leadership and key cadres at certain industrial facilities. The increased pace of the program since the late 1960's and its limited nature suggest that the Soviets may be undertaking these efforts with China in mind as much as the U.S. and that they are not a response to the ABM Treaty, as some have charged.

Moscow Comments on Indian Ocean Arms Limitations: In the first Soviet public reference to Indian Ocean arms limitations since your March 9 news conference and UN speech, Podgorny told a state banquet in Zanzibar that the first step in establishing a zone of peace in the area was the elimination of imperialist military bases. He added that Moscow has no bases in the area and has no intention of building any and is prepared to consider, along with other states concerned, the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. State notes that these have been the articulated Soviet positions on the Indian Ocean zone of peace for some time and the fact that the same positions have been restated so unequivocally could mean that the Soviets intend to stonewall or sidestep Secretary Vance's planned initiative on this subject in Moscow.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

Approved For Release 2005/02/01 : NLC-1-1-3-60-0

Approved For Release 2005/02/01: NLC-1-1-3-60-0

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

-3
25X1

## TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

Approved For Release 2005/02/01 : NLC-1-1-3-60-0