The Political Aspect of the Relationship between the Federal Organs of Government of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, 1990-1994
V. V. Kogan-Iasnyi
The activation of the social movements for the political self-governance of Chechnya at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was informed by several factors. First, for the Chechens, the question of an ethnic-territorial association had historical significance. The historical memory of the war against the Russian Empire, Stalinist repression, and the mass deportations were guarded by all generations. Secondly, the election of the government of B. N. Yeltsin in June 1990 as the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and this popular leader’s struggle with the collapsing communist system and the “union center” of M. S. Gorbachev facilitated this process. Thirdly, those who voiced political opposition to the plans of Yeltsin to raise the status of the government of the RSFSR used against him, as it were, his own weapons, by facilitating the raising of the status of territories within the very RSFSR.
This entire struggle, which manipulated and exploited the status of the different territorial units in the Soviet Union, could be accomplished because the relevant laws were, in many ways, legal fictions. When Stalin and his colleagues created these laws, they did not intend for them to have real political or legal force. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev was not prepared to face the increasing demands of regional and local leaders for autonomy. Thus, the disintegration of the Soviet Union became a reality, opening up the possibility for a series of serious and tragic mistakes.
By contrast, Yeltsin knew how to forge alliances with the republic leaders, but was less able to do so within the RSFSR. Yeltsin’s main political consultant, S. M. Sakhrai, was responsible for developing a theory of the “territorial integrity of Russia against the territorial integrity of the union.” In other words, the Soviet Union was fated to collapse, but its collapse could be used to strengthen the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
This theory met practical opposition from many corners. At the time, Tatarstan seemed the most likely candidate to attempt to pull away from the Russian Federation. By contrast, the then Checheno-Ingushetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ChIASSR) seemed passive. No one sensed the stirring of a cultural and political underground.
Since 1983, Doku Zavgaev, a Party functionary, had led the ASSR. On 27 November 1990, Zavgaev, in his capacity as the president of the Supreme Soviet of the ChIASSR, signed a declaration on the state sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingushetian Republic. This, in effect, raised the ChIASSR to the level of a republic. In practice, however, nothing changed. At the time, neither the Russian nor the Soviet Union authorities protested against this move.
At the same time, a meeting of the Chechen National Congress elected an executive committee, which evolved into the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen Nation (OKChN). The president of this committee was Major-General Dzhokar Dudaev. The Executive Committee soon became the forum for a dispute between a national-radical wing and a liberal-democratic wing. Supporting the former wing, Dudaev used this dispute to conduct his first small revolution.
The political conflict in Chechnya was greatly exacerbated by the failed putsch and protracted political crisis in the Soviet Union beginning in August 1991. This led to the dissolution of the ChIASSR. Yet whereas the Ingushetians formed an autonomous republic within the RSFSR, the Chechens demanded a sovereign Chechen Republic. This decision increased the political uncertainty, and precipitated a full split amongst the politicians of Chechnya.
At the same time, the RSFSR began to increase its political intervention in Chechnya, demanding the disarming of all illegal military formations. The Soviet armed forces also attempted at this time to mobilize all Chechen men of military age into a national guard. Critically, numerous leaders in Russia seemed prepared to end the political conflict through use of armed force. Thus, already on 19 October 1991 Boris Yeltsin issued what was in effect an ultimatum to the secessionist leadership of Chechnya.
On 27 October 1991, Dudaev was elected president of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic. The Supreme Soviet refused to recognize the validity of the election. Meanwhile, A. Arsenov became the leader of the anti-Dudaev parallel government. On 2 November, another Chechen, R. Khasbulatov, became the president of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.
In early November 1991, a military operation was decided upon, but without any preparations. The most important political figures in Moscow would be involved in both the decision to pursue armed conflict and in the execution of that conflict.
At the beginning of 1992, the situation changed abruptly. The Soviet Union ceased to exist, and 15 independent states were recognized on former Soviet territory. The Russian Federation assumed a dual position vis-à-vis Dudaev, who combined anti-Russian rhetoric with real moves in the international arena in the guise of political independence. In fact, Dudaev wanted to extract the maximum possible benefit out of an undefined situation. Moscow facilitated this because it did not want to take any serious decisions in this complicated situation. Dudaev consolidated his command over most of the armed forces and weapons stationed on the territory of Chechnya. In the eyes of Moscow, the resolution of the Chechen problem was to be postponed for the future. Thus, Moscow no longer openly contended the position of Dudaev as the president of the Chechen Republic. In the media, meanwhile, the case of Chechnya continued to receive much less attention than that of Tatarstan.
Dudaev’s personality contributed to the conflict in the Caucasus, in Chechnya and beyond. Dudaev considered himself a friend of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the opponent of Eduard Shevardnadze. Dudaev openly joined Russia in supporting the Abkhaz rebellion against Georgia in 1992 and 1993. Moreover, much evidence argues for the hypothesis that Dudaev strongly believed that his personal ties to Boris Yeltsin would assist a resolution of the Checheno-Russian conflict. In fact, the contradictions inherent in this relationship contributed significantly to an escalation of the conflict.
During this period, however, dialogue continued between Russia and Chechnya. In March 1992, Russian and Chechen negotiators agreed on a joint communiqué on the resolution of the conflict. This encompassed political, legal, economic, and collective security aspects. Towards the end of 1992, many saw the agreement on wide-ranging autonomy for Tatarstan as a model which could be applied to Chechnya. Yet even then, some circles in Moscow advocated a forceful solution of the conflict with Chechnya. In November 1992, the conflict escalated as both sides mobilized their armed forces. In effect, by the end of 1992, Russian governance no longer extended to Chechnya.
Negotiations proceeded in the spring of 1993, but the steps taken by the Russian side were inconsequential and unsystematic. The separation of Chechnya from the Russian Federation continued to be a de facto reality, as the Chechens refused to participate in the April 1993 referendum on the government. Dudaev used the spring and summer of 1993 to remove those structures in Chechnya which were not loyal to him. Dudaev also attempted to monopolize the (declining) petroleum production of Chechnya. Moreover, Chechnya was located on the critical Baku-Novorossisk pipeline. All of these factors put Dudaev on a collision course with the government in Russia.
After the conflict between Yeltsin and the Russian Duma in September and October 1993, the politics of Moscow in relationship to Grozny assumed a more determined outline. In accordance with the constitution of the Russian Federation promulgated on 12 December 1993, the Chechen Republic remained a subject of the Russian Federation, without any mention of special status. In effect, many of those who had worked actively for the collapse of the Soviet Union were paradoxically insisting on the integrity of the Russian Federation. These individuals feared a “domino effect” if one of the constitutive parts of the Russian Federation were allowed to secede. In Moscow, an increasing number of decision-makers were leaning towards a forceful solution of the Chechen conflict.
All of 1994 passed by under the sign of contradictions, interconnecting events, and important declarations on the parts of both Grozny and Moscow. The two sides, instead of negotiating directly, held talks about talks. The atmosphere was made bleaker by an increased number of terrorist attacks from the Chechen side. Russian mass media worked to create a positive image of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic as a legislative structure, against the unrecognized “Dudaev regime.” As autumn approached, Moscow showed no intention of suggesting a compromise with Dudaev and his administration. On the contrary, the activity and preparation of the Russian armed forces continued.
For his part, Dudaev continued to transform the Chechen Republic into an armed enclave. He expelled all Russian journalists from Chechnya, along with all representatives of peacekeeping and human rights organizations. Despite all of this, it must be mentioned that the issue of Chechnya continued to occupy only peripheral importance in Russia. This would remain the case until the anti-Dudaev opposition’s 1994 assault on Grozny.
Until the very beginning of the military operations in Chechnya, both sides continued to entertain hopes that they would be able to reach a compromise. They thought so despite the fact that neither side budged from two basically incompatible negotiating positions.
Analyzing the history and character of the political interrelationship between the federal offices of the Russian Federation and the leading circles of Chechnya from August 1991 to December 1994, one can conclude the following:
1. The change of government in Grozny took place in the period from August to November 1991 despite the legislation of the RSFSR and the USSR.
2. The proclamation by the new government of the independence of the Chechen Republic and the claims for the corresponding political, military, and economic attributes of this independence also took place as a violation of the Constitution and the legislation of Russia.
3. The attempt of forces to return Chechnya to the legal framework of Russia, in November 1991, led to a contradictory result. It justified, in the eyes of a significant part of the Chechen society, the illegal actions taken by forces supporting the independence of the Chechen Republic.
4. Neither the different elements of the federal government of Russia, nor the government of the Chechen Republic Ichkeriia (ChRI), led by Dudaev, took any realistic steps towards a solution of the political crisis. Neither side utilized the tools at its disposal to seek a resolution of the conflict.
5. The secret actions taken by forces loyal to the Russian federal government on the territory of Chechnya, helped to consolidate the Chechen society in a position antagonistic to Russians. As a result, this seriously limited the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
6. The military solution of the crisis was inadmissible and cannot be justified by political, military, or moral arguments.